Rapid #: -19646884

CROSS REF ID: **256512**

LENDER: **RM0 :: Main Library**

BORROWER: **LAF :: Skillman Library**

TYPE:	Book Chapter
BOOK TITLE:	Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies.
USER BOOK TITLE:	Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies.
CHAPTER TITLE:	“Kashmiri Diaspora Mobilizations: Towards Transnational Solidarity in an Age of Settler-Colonialism”
BOOK AUTHOR:	Hafsa Kanjwal
EDITION:	
VOLUME:	
PUBLISHER:	
YEAR:	2022
PAGES:	379-395
ISBN:	9780429330810
LCCN:	
OCLC #:	

Processed by RapidX: 10/5/2022 3:08:34 PM

Copyright Act 1968
Notice for paragraph 49 (7A) (c) of the Copyright Act 1968
Warning
This material has been provided to you under section 49 of the Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) for the purposes of research or study. The contents of the material may be subject to copyright protection under the Act.
Further dealings by you with this material may be a copyright infringement. To determine whether such a communication would be an infringement, it is necessary to have regard to the criteria set out in Division 3 of Part III of the Act

27

KASHMIR DIASPORA MOBILIZATIONS

Toward Transnational Solidarity in an Age of Settler Colonialism

Hafsa Kanjwal

Introduction

A few days before August 5, 2019, Kashmiri Americans affiliated with the group Stand with Kashmir, along with other diaspora Kashmiris and allies, rolled out the "Red for Kashmir" campaign, encouraging supporters to change their profile pictures to red across social media platforms to raise awareness of increasing levels of repression in Kashmir. By the time the Indian government de-operationalized Article 370 of the Indian constitution and demoted the region to a union territory directly under the Indian government a few days later, all forms of communication, including landlines, mobile services, and internet, had been shut down. Kashmir had been effectively cut off from the rest of the world. In that moment, the Kashmiri diaspora – a transnational network of individuals and families across the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Europe, Australia, and the Middle East – effectively became the voice of a silenced people (Sadeque 2019).

Over the next few months, the diaspora drew attention to the historical and present-day dimensions of India's occupation and settler colonial project in Kashmir by organizing major protests, engaging in political advocacy campaigns with their elected officials and government representatives, and conducting a series of educational events in universities and community spaces. It was – as a number of participants in interviews for this project stated – unprecedented for the Kashmiri diaspora to be so politically mobilized on the issue since the early 1990s. Fearing that the Indian government had taken a drastic and irrevocable step that would pave the way for genocide of Kashmiri Muslims, the diaspora felt it had a moral responsibility to speak on behalf of their now silenced nation.

Diaspora mobilizations that emerge from conflict-generated regions are often involved in advocacy efforts which involve

> individual and collective action of identity-based social entrepreneurs who organize and encourage migrants to behave in a concerted way to make home-land oriented claims, bring about a political objective, or contribute to a cause.
>
> *(Koinova 2016: 501)*

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

DOI: 10.4324/9780429330810-33

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

Part of this includes the harnessing of "material and symbolic resources to reach a collective goal." These mobilizations can occur through national (host country) or transnational networks. Yet, even amid these conflict-generated diaspora mobilizations – a number of contestations and dilemmas emerge.

As Kashmiri American movements gained traction in the months following August 5, it became clear that engaging in diaspora mobilization for Kashmir requires serious and sustained engagement with questions of privilege, positionality, and representation. Who constitutes the Kashmiri diaspora, and what should be its role? What is a transformative solidarity model for Kashmir, and what fault lines should be addressed to build it? And most important, how does a small, less-resourced diaspora facilitate and amplify a long-standing resistance movement against an occupying power with significant material resources and global economic and political influence?

Diaspora engagement on the issue of Kashmir is not new. British Kashmiris, especially those from Azad Kashmir, have engaged in significant activism across decades (Ali 2009; Ellis and Khan 1998;). In the UK in the late 1970s, Amanullah Khan founded the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), an explicitly pro-independence party that ultimately initiated the armed struggle in Indian occupied Kashmir (Sökefeld and Bolognani 2011). In the 1990s, both the US and UK diaspora were active in raising awareness of India's militarization, human rights violations, the resistance movement and the right to self-determination. Over the past few decades, diasporic activism has ebbed and flowed for reasons including fear and frustration, tensions over aspirational differences, privilege, and political apathy – as well as more foundational ideological concerns and questions surrounding the role of the diaspora in the politically contested context of Kashmir.

In this chapter, I critically analyze the complexities of diaspora mobilization and transnational solidarity work through examination of the US-based, Indian-occupied Kashmiri Muslim diaspora movement. My focus on the Kashmiri Muslim diaspora from the Indian-occupied Kashmir Valley is designed, not to restrict conceptualizations of the Kashmiri diaspora overall, but rather to narrow the scope of my project based on my own research and advocacy. I approach these questions through the lens of my own experiences as a Kashmiri American who was born in Kashmir and raised in the US, who has extensive networks of family and friends in Kashmir, and who regularly returns to Kashmir for research and family visits. My active engagement as a Kashmir scholar in the Kashmiri American diaspora mobilizations include detailed discussions with variously positioned individuals across a wide diaspora community network in the United States as well as the United Kingdom and Europe, planning and coordination of campus and community events, rallies, and summits, and communication with students, activists, researchers, journalists, and artists in Kashmir. My positionality as a Kashmiri American researcher is very much embedded in the structures of privilege that being in the United States provides me, and I continuously attempt to be self-reflexive by challenging interrogating identity categories and power dynamics. I have also conducted several oral history interviews with diaspora leadership from the 1990s and gathered informational materials from a number of relevant organizations. I argue that the Kashmiri American diaspora should pursue a model of transnational solidarity activism, and that this role must be mediated by a critical self-reflexivity on the part of the diaspora that engages with questions of privilege and positionality.

Thinking Through the Kashmir "Diaspora"

The term diaspora refers to "social groups that settle and establish themselves in another country and are internally heterogeneous. . . . Diasporas are rarely constituted by a single factor other

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

than the broadest of connections to a specific homeland" (Smith 2007: 5). Diaspora is a useful category, as it "configures certain conceptions of movement, settlement, and the attendant negotiations with power" (Bald et al. 2013: 7). However, as scholars have argued, the term can also be limiting. In the context of Kashmir, the term "diaspora" is complicated by the already contested nature of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Does the Kashmir diaspora, for example, only include individuals from the Kashmir Valley? How does it factor in Kashmiri Pandits, many of whom may not broadly identify with the movement for self-determination? Does it include people from Jammu and Ladakh? Azad Kashmir? Gilgit-Baltistan? Do Kashmiris who have settled in different cities in India or Pakistan constitute a diaspora? It is clear that the diaspora itself is diverse geographically, religiously, ethnically, politically, and linguistically. Different diaspora communities have varying political interests and aspirations – important distinctions to consider for broader diaspora mobilizations.

Scholars have also raised concerns over the ways in which the term diaspora flattens the multiplicity of displacements in time and space and whether the term diaspora can accommodate or coexist with a "politics of return" (Peteet 2007). Writing on the Palestinian diaspora, Peteet calls for a disaggregation of the term diaspora that would "facilitate more precise and complex understandings of different types of movements, their historical and political origins, and the role of violence" (Peteet 2007: 629). Similarly, the Kashmiri diaspora is diverse not only in terms of its demographic composition, but also in terms of the multiple reasons for which people were made to leave, even before 1947. This ranges from political and economic persecution, forced migration, ethnic cleansing, political oppression, and economic opportunity. Multiple historical contexts – including political and economic repression by the pre-1947 Dogra regime, ethnic cleansing of Jammu Muslims in 1947 by the Dogra Maharaja, migration of workers from Mirpur in Azad Kashmir to the United Kingdom, departure of Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims from the Valley in the early 1990s – have shaped the varying displacements of what could potentially constitute a "diaspora." Crucially, "uncritical invocations of diaspora risk minimizing the range of traumatic conditions that fuel displacement and the way these shape sociocultural formations and subjectivity" (Peteet 2007: 630). Thinking through the modes of diaspora mobilizations requires attention to this range of "traumatic conditions" as well as to the politics of return, given the region's division between two hostile nation-states, and the people originating or displaced from either side are rarely able to travel across.

Over the past few decades, scholarship in international relations and political science has focused on the role of diaspora communities in contributing to political developments in their "homeland." Much of this literature has focused on whether diasporas have contributed to their homeland in roles that can either create conflict or build peace (Smith 2007). More recent work has focused on the question of diaspora positionality – whether

> embedded in a certain context, diaspora political agents can take advantage of a conglomeration of unique socio-spatial characteristics of that place such as institutions, networks, resources, political culture, infrastructure, history, position of the state in the international system, and others.
>
> *(Koinova 2017: 603)*

Later in this chapter, I examine the ways in which the Kashmiri American diaspora is implicated in the processes of US empire.

In our conversations, Kashmiris in Kashmir often draw a distinction between the experiences of Kashmiris living "on the ground" and "under occupation," and the experiences of the "diaspora" who had the "privilege" to leave. This distinction expresses the sense that the

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

diaspora is disconnected from what is happening in Kashmir, given their spatial and temporal distance from the homeland. This corresponds to one of the primary criticisms of the Kashmiri-American diaspora: that they occupy a space of privilege, removed from realities on the ground, that makes it difficult for them to understand the depth of what is happening in Kashmir and to authentically speak about that experience. This critique is compounded by the sentiment that Kashmiri diasporas worldwide had not mobilized in meaningful ways prior to August 5, and that the new diaspora mobilizations may be driven by multiple motivations, such as securing one's economic interests amid a settler colonial project. This trust deficit poses significant challenges to Kashmiri diaspora communities in the United States and elsewhere.

Nonetheless, despite criticisms, many in Kashmir feel the diaspora has a role to play in advocating for Kashmir – although there are also multiple understandings of that role. Some argue that the diaspora can and should only take direction from "the ground," and not serve in any representative capacity for Kashmir, or claim to speak "for" the people of Kashmir, but rather amplify their voices. In this perspective, diaspora leadership should not emerge to serve in a representative capacity. This position suggests that any diasporic attempts to represent Kashmir would not derive legitimacy from "the ground."

Many in the diaspora do not necessarily see a striking binary between those in the diaspora and those in the "homeland" because itinerant migration patterns are constantly evolving and because many in the diaspora have also lived through and experienced life under occupation. Arguing against such distinctions based on notions of authenticity, they claim that political mobilizations driven by hierarchies of victimhood and suffering will lead to counterproductive forms of exclusion and fragmentation. They also argue that given the ways in which the Indian state has completely clamped down on any form of dissent in Kashmir and placed all of the resistance leadership under arrest or detention, the time may come where the diaspora will potentially have to play a bigger role in terms of representation, especially in international platforms.

The example of revolutionary movements (such as Palestine, Iran, and Algeria) is instructive to this discussion, given the formative role that those who were in exile – and thus away from the "ground" – played in shaping the contours of such movements. Given that formative thinking and organizing for major social and political movements happened among those in exile (some more successful than others), one of my interviewees, Imraan Mir, a Kashmiri American lawyer, posed the question: "Does the diaspora have a role in influencing and shaping the narrative that ultimately contributes to what people in Kashmir think about their future and their aspirations?" If the diaspora has a responsibility – given its tremendous privilege, which includes time, space, and resources – "how do they then ethically raise concerns about Kashmir, or use that privilege? Can privilege be used constructively to take the conversation or shape the outcome in a particular way?" (Mir, Interview). Here, the use of the term "privilege" is not perceived negatively, but rather as a responsibility – a call to action. A similar question that merits consideration is the role of the Kashmiri intelligentsia, a number of whom are spread across the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and elsewhere. Given the statist and functional educational systems that exist in Kashmir as well as political repression in Kashmir, can an intelligentsia come together from within the diaspora?

These questions do not have easy answers. I suggest that these categories continuously be negotiated and re-negotiated given the circumstances in Kashmir. More critically, another question that arises out of this set of concerns is who constitutes the "self" embodied in the movement for "self-determination." If the diaspora is included in this "self," then is the diaspora an integral part of the movement, and not simply a tool of amplification? And if the diaspora is not included in this "self," then what are the boundaries, and how are they negotiated?

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

A transnational solidarity model requires a radical shift away from past or present forms of mobilization that also complicate particular categories. And an engaged diaspora must remain cognizant and accountable of its privilege, engaging in continual reflection on the ways in which acts of (mis)representation may enact epistemic – or actual – violence on Kashmiris. Here, I take a cue from Bourgois and Schonberg, whose analysis of representational practices in relation to ethnography and photography can also apply to diaspora advocacy. They argue that representational practices are "torn between objectifying and humanizing, exploiting and giving voice, propagandizing and documenting injustice, stigmatizing and revealing; fomenting voyeurism and promoting empathy; stereotyping and analyzing" (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009: 15). This is a fine line to tread. How can we reimagine categories of belonging to Kashmir that refuse an articulation in relation to competing identities, authenticities, or victimhood, while also maintaining cognizance of different forms of privilege and positionality?

History of the Kashmiri American Muslim Diaspora

As with a number of other immigrant groups to the United States, it is important to situate the Kashmiri American Muslim diaspora in the backdrop of "shifting regimes of capital accumulation, drawing out a historical continuum moving from territorially based empire to neocolonialism" (Bald et al. 2013: 5). This includes understanding the role of wars, capitalist expansion, militarism, religious mobilization, and political movements in shaping the demographic contours of diaspora as well as the "longstanding and ongoing military, geopolitical, and economic pursuits" of the United States in South Asia.

While a small number of Kashmiris came to the United States for further education as early as the 1930s, the first substantial group of Kashmiri Americans that settled in the United States were professionals – mostly doctors – that arrived after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished an earlier quota system based on national origin and established a new immigration policy that attracted educated, skilled labor to the United States. The implementation of this act enabled physicians, engineers, and other professionals to come to the United States, mostly for economic opportunities. Many of them were from relatively privileged upper middle class or bureaucratic families in Kashmir, including those affiliated with the state government. Members of Islamic study circles and groups, including Jamaat-i-Islami, relocated to the US and UK after facing increasing repression from the J&K state government. The 1990s saw another wave of Kashmiri Muslim immigration to the United States, especially after the rise of the armed rebellion. Since 2000, a number of young professionals, many of them scientists or in information technology, have moved to the United States for education and employment, given the lack of opportunities in Kashmir, as well as increasing hostility toward Kashmiri Muslims in India. Over the past five decades, the causes of migration in the diaspora range from seeking economic and educational opportunities to fleeing political persecution and violence.

In the initial decades of Kashmiri presence in the US, there was some political activity. Farooq Kathwari, the Kashmiri American CEO and President of Ethan Allen, narrates that he arrived in the United States in the mid-1960s to attend business school in New York. At the time, Kashmir was a topic of heated debate at the United Nations. Kathwari established a committee for the future of Kashmir and wrote a manifesto making the case for a free Kashmir (Kathwari 2019: 74). According to Ghulam Nabi Mir, a Kashmiri American doctor who moved to the United States in 1974 and was instrumental in the early history of the Kashmiri American diaspora, the initial group of physicians were not politically active (Mir, Interview 2020). In subsequent years, a number of them wrote brochures about Kashmir and tried to raise awareness of the issue. The group initially sponsored a number of awareness raising activities and

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

was involved with the national Muslim Students Association, of which two of them, Ghulam Nabi Fai and Sayyid Syeed, had a leadership role (Fai, Interview 2020). One of their activities was collecting funds for orphans in Kashmir. In 1978, a group of Kashmiri Americans founded the Kashmir Muslim Association of North America (KMA) that continued awareness raising activities. Throughout the 1980s, the KMA would often meet in Buffalo, New York, the adopted home to a number of Kashmiri immigrants given a number of families that had initially settled there.

Political Advocacy in the 1990s

Significant political activity took hold in the 1990s. The start of the armed rebellion, massive civilian uprising, imposition of Governor's rule, and subsequent militarization and massacres of Kashmiri civilians resulted in what Maria Koinova calls a "critical juncture." This juncture led to a "transformative event" in which the diaspora dramatically increased its mobilization in response to reports of grave human rights violations (Koinova 2018). In 1990, the Kashmir American Council (KAC) was incorporated after nearly 100 Kashmiri Americans met at a home in Maryland. Ghulam Nabi Fai, who had been active with the Muslim Students Association and related diaspora advocacy efforts, was selected by an ad hoc board of community leaders to serve as its executive director. Separately, Farooq Kathwari organized the Committee for Solidarity in Kashmir, which included both Hindu and Muslim Kashmiris. The committee "found common ground and issued a number of statements calling for a fair settlement of the Kashmir issue" (Kathwari 2019: 204).

In our interview, Mir mentioned that the first gathering in Maryland attracted Kashmiri Americans from across the political spectrum, including some linked to the pro-Indian political parties in Kashmir. According to Mir, at that time, the ideological divisions that had begun to emerge in Kashmir between the JKLF, which supported an independent state, and the Jamaat-i-Islami, which supported merger with Pakistan, had not surfaced in the diaspora. Despite varying ideological loyalties among its leadership, the KAC focused on the human rights violations against Kashmiris as well as a resolution to the Kashmir issue that foreground Kashmiri aspirations. Even those affiliated with the India-leaning parties were welcome, as there appeared to be a collective realization "that there is a problem that needs to be resolved" (Mir, Interview 2020).

The KAC was a nonprofit member-based organization based in Washington, DC with local meetings in cities like New York, Los Angeles, and Buffalo that had a significant Kashmiri population. There was also a Central Coordinating Committee (CCC) made up of seven regional representatives across the country (Fai, Interview 2020). Due to its sizeable Kashmiri American population, Buffalo was given two representatives in the CCC in the KAC's Constitution. The CCC would meet in different cities across the United States where there was a significant Kashmiri presence. The KAC actively lobbied both Republican and Democratic Congressional representatives, met with White House, State Department, and National Security Council officials, and also sent reports and briefing documents to various foreign embassies, country missions to the United Nations, international organizations, and think tanks. The KAC published newsletters, pamphlets, and books on the history of the movement, occupation, lack of independent political processes, human rights violations, and other political topics. In 1990, they hired a lobbying firm to manage their outreach to Congress. The KAC also had close relationships with a number of American Muslim organizations, including the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA). KAC members met annually at

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

ISNA's Annual Convention, and they were often a part of the program, speaking at different sessions. In 1991, some KAC members and British Kashmiris started the World Kashmir Freedom Movement (WKFM) to focus specifically on international advocacy.

The KAC's largest events were the annual peace conferences on Kashmir, that would be held in Washington, DC and New York City. Conference invitees and participants were not only Congressional officials, but also US-based professors and think tank experts, as well as official government representatives and other prominent citizens from India and Pakistan. Indian and Pakistani officials and journalists were invited to attend and present their viewpoints. Indian officials never attended in their official capacity, though Pakistani officials would. The KAC and WKFM also organized conferences in London, Brussels, and Islamabad. Civil society and political leaders from both Kashmir and the diaspora would attend to meet with American officials. Other advocacy events included participation in a number of congressional hearings and briefings on human rights in South Asia, as well as UN-related conferences, and meetings with the State Department as well as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). KAC lobbying efforts bore some limited successes. For example, in the 1990s, through its lobbyists in Congress, the KAC was able to convince the US Congress to halt development aid to India until India released members of the pro-freedom leadership from prison (Fai, Interview 2020). In addition, through their lobbying efforts with sympathetic congressional officials, four total resolutions were introduced in both the House and Senate regarding Kashmir. These resolutions foregrounded the right to self-determination as promised in successive UN resolutions and condemned the excessive use of force by the Indian forces, while also denouncing the violence of Kashmiri militant groups. They also called for journalists, human rights organizations, and humanitarian organizations to have access to Kashmir, and called for a cut in development aid to India until it improved its human rights in Kashmir (Relating to the Conflict in Kashmir 1995). While not all of the resolutions passed, and some were not able to make it to a vote, the criticism of India's human rights record in Kashmir allowed for the amplification of the Kashmir issue in the US Congress.

KAC and WKFM board members travelled to Pakistan and met with representatives of the different Kashmiri factions there to encourage unity. Diaspora leadership was intimately engaged with the Srinagar-based All Parties Hurriyat Conference leaders, speaking to them on a frequent basis. The KAC would organize, schedule, and host Hurriyat agendas and meetings when their leadership and representatives visited the US, although the Hurriyat never appointed any of the diaspora as their official representatives or spokespersons (Fai, Interview 2020). For example, Yasin Malik, the co-founder of the All Parties Hurriyet Conference and the Chairman of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front came to the United States in March 2001. The KAC organized his meetings with the editorial boards of various newspapers, government missions of various offices at the UN, ambassadors, congressional officials, think tanks, and State Department officials (Kashmir American Council 2001). Fai stated that leading offices in the US government, such as the State Department and the National Security Council, relied on the KAC to communicate with the resistance leadership in Kashmir.

The KAC's advocacy efforts focused on providing updated information on recent developments in Kashmir, including the human rights violations committed by Indian forces, as well as highlighting the role that the US should play in resolving the dispute. The KAC focused their attention on demilitarization, ending human rights violations and removing draconian laws, and fulfilling the right to self-determination, while refusing to endorse a settlement of either independence or alignment with Pakistan. As Mir said, the primary aim was "how not to see an Indian soldier in Kashmir." While the group did have internal discussions on multiple

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

possibilities for the future of Kashmir, Mir states they recognized that "political opinion can change depending on what is happening." All of their activities were centered on the premise that Kashmiris from all regions were an integral part of the Kashmir dispute, and that a legitimate leadership of Kashmiris must be included in all negotiations between India and Pakistan. They attempted to do outreach to officials and representatives from India and Pakistan, as well as the various units of the princely Jammu and Kashmir state.

For example, the KAC took a leading role in drafting the "Brussels Resolution," in April 2004 along with Kuldip Nayar, an Indian parliamentarian and the former High Commissioner of India to the United Kingdom. The resolution was a part of the "Discourse on Kashmir" jointly sponsored by the All Party Kashmir Group on Kashmir of the European Parliament and the ICHR Kashmir Center (The Brussels Resolution 2004). The resolution called for a peace mission of Kashmiri expatriates to India and Pakistan, a withdrawal of forces and bunkers from civilian areas, repeal of draconian laws, release of political prisoners, access to human rights organizations, and the freedom of movement for Hurriyet leaders.

Throughout the 1990s, the KAC faced increasing financial challenges. While Pakistani-Americans made substantial financial contributions, other Muslim-American communities offered only limited support. As these pressures mounted, the Indian government also retaliated against the diaspora leadership by denying a number of them visitor visas. Some of them remain unable to return to Kashmir.

Other members of the diaspora initiated working groups on Kashmir, and were involved in direct international diplomacy between India and Pakistan. After meeting with Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri leaders in 1994, and hearing about the vast gulf in understanding amongst the various stakeholders, Farooq Kathwari founded the Kashmir Study Group (KSG) in 1996, to "refocus the discussion on some meaningful options rather than on empty nationalistic slogans" (Kathwari 2019: 209). The group included congressional representatives, presidents of think tanks and nonprofit organizations, foreign policy experts, academics, and former ambassadors. Kathwari was the only member from Jammu and Kashmir, which he describes as a deliberate choice "since [I] was eager to avoid making KSG seem like a political organization of a lobbying group representing anyone with a vested interest in the conflict" (Kathwari 2019: 210). The group visited India, Pakistan, and Kashmir in 1997 and spoke to a wide range of people. The report *The Kashmir Dispute at Fifty* was published in 1997, and provided a set of 12 recommendations regarding short-term confidence-building measures and other steps. KSG had relationships with think tanks like the US Institute of Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and also held meetings between Indian, Pakistani, and US officials. Kathwari writes that he kept US officials abreast of his meetings with various political leaders in South Asia.

The Livingston Proposal was a result of these meetings; the proposal called for the establishment of self-governing entities in both the regions administered by India and Pakistan, and the establishment of an all-Kashmir body that would coordinate areas of broader interest such as regional trade, tourism, environment and water resources. The proposal also called for the demilitarization of all five entities with India and Pakistan responsible for the foreign affairs and defense of these entities. Kathwari mentions that various stakeholders had given their "cautious approval" to the framework of the proposal (Kathwari 2019: 217). During the Musharraf-Vajpayee years, in particular, Kathwari and the KSG played a role in back-channel diplomacy between the two countries. According to Kathwari, parts of the Livingston proposal would come to be adopted into the four-point plan between Musharraf and Vajpayee. Progress on the plan, however, came to a halt after the attack on the Indian parliament on December 12, 2001. While some discussions continued, Kathwari mentioned that some

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

> hard liners in India . . . had dug in their heels. . . . They insisted that India's leaders refuse to meet with their Pakistani counterparts without receiving significant up front concessions – a demand that effectively precluded serious talks.
>
> *(Kathwari 2019: 226)*

Subsequent attempts to create possibilities for dialogue, including through the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs 2005, would be derailed as a result of changing geopolitics in India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, Kathwari believes that the KSG's work to reframe the international debate about Kashmir bore some fruit –

> certain realities that were formerly little known have not become widely recognized . . . there is now a growing recognition that this region must have the ability to government itself, and that the self-governing option could also be provided to other regions of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir.
>
> *(Kathwari 2019: 236)*

In July 2011, KAC Director Fai was charged with participating in a long-term conspiracy to act as an agent of the Pakistani government in the US without registering with the Attorney General in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). In December he pled guilty to conspiracy and tax violations (*USA vs. Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai* 2012). Fai's arrest gave rise to feelings of skepticism, resignation, and betrayal among many members of the Kashmiri American diaspora community. The lack of human and financial resources also dealt a significant blow to diasporic mobilization. The arrest was a transformative event, significantly increasing concerns over trust and surveillance, while decreasing support through donations and mobilizations. Meanwhile, developments in the subcontinent made the potential for peace talks elusive. Kashmiris who remained active in diaspora politics struggled to keep the Kashmir issue alive amongst the balance of the diaspora.

Over time, and especially in the 2000s, the Indian lobby and Indian Americans gained traction in the US, especially surrounding the passage of the controversial US-India nuclear agreement in 2005 (Mishra 2016; Kirk 2008; Mistry 2013–14; Kurien 2017). Well-funded and professional Indian Americans played a critical role in securing the agreement's passage in the US Congress. They also became more politically influential – both domestically, but also in India, as researchers noted a "saffronization" of Indian American politics that contributed to the rise of Hindu nationalism both in India and in the diaspora, as well as increasing Islamophobia (Biswas 2010; Rajagopal 2000; Kurien 2004; Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007). September 11 was yet another transformative event for US relations with South Asia. While the United States sought a working relationship with Pakistan for the War on Terror, it also began a robust engagement with India on matters concerning trade, defense, energy, technology, and containing China (van de Wetering 2016; Jaffrelot 2009; Jain 2016). India was able to appropriate the discourses surrounding the Global War on Terror in the context of Kashmir, and the US became increasingly hands-off the Kashmir dispute (Baruah 2007). Kashmir was simply not a priority. In the diaspora as well, concerns rose of political engagement in the post-9/11 context, especially for causes that were being painted as part of the War on Terror (Naber 2006; Takyar 2019; Maira 2016). Other diaspora groups, including prominent Palestinian Americans, had experienced severe surveillance and were targeted by the American authorities, such as the high-profile Holy Land Foundation case (Peled 2018).

Reflecting on the post-9/11 context, Mir commented that "it started to feel impossible, and many people lost hope in the cause . . . when things are hot, people sign on to it, when

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

the returns start diminishing, everyone falls off the band wagon." This fatigue is not unique to Kashmir. Especially in the context of prolonged crisis, when earlier mobilization efforts have been futile, diasporas find it difficult to be motivated and mobilize in meaningful ways. Individuals may question the impact of their efforts if they do not see positive outcomes over time, have no way to voice their political views in the homeland, and have been defeated by particular transformative events. Koinova analyzes this through a distinction between "sustained" and "episodic" mobilizations:

> Sustained mobilization occurs when organization of claim-making and material and symbolic resources takes place without interruption to address a common issue. Despite inevitable competition among individuals, there are common grievances, targets, action-oriented frames, and formal and informal networks engaged to proactively channel discontent. Episodic mobilization takes place when claims are made and resources drawn as necessary for specific events. Grievances may exist, but not be common, and claim-making is mostly reactive. A key distinguishing factor is the durability of claim-making through perpetuation and interconnection of initiatives, including organized gatherings, public statements, lobbying, books, blogs, and other activities.
>
> *(Koinova 2016: 503)*

For the Kashmir diaspora, this distinction is relevant as political mobilizations have primarily been episodic – the challenge, now, is how to engage in advocacy through more sustained means.

While political advocacy existed along an episodic continuum, the Kashmiri American diaspora has remained involved in various cultural and humanitarian efforts. Over the past two decades, this has resulted in a consistently sustained engagement with relief and humanitarian efforts. Many such efforts sought to remain "apolitical" and focus more on developmental or charitable work. Health care, education, culture, and women's empowerment were amongst the target areas. These included groups like Chinar International, the Guru Foundation, the Kathwari Foundation, Kashmir Earthquake Relief, Kashmircorps, the Kashmir Foundation of America, Revive Kashmir, Kashmer, Funkar, and the Kashmir Education Initiative, amongst others.

There was significant humanitarian diasporic mobilization during two main natural disasters: the earthquake of 2005 and the floods in 2014. The humanitarian and charity organizations involved had to maintain a strictly apolitical stance, especially given they were beholden to their Indian FCRA status in order to operate in Kashmir, a dilemma they continue to negotiate. The Kashmiri American Muslim diaspora has also sought to build a sense of community and belonging and preserve their culture and heritage create a social and cultural space through annual events such as the Kashmir Gathering of North America (KGNA), a three-day gathering that brings together Kashmiri Americans and Kashmiri Canadians for a series of social and cultural events, educational activities, and networking opportunities. In its inception, the gathering was explicitly apolitical. This was met by criticism by some diaspora members as well as those on the ground in Kashmir. They argued that while one can understand why humanitarian organizations might have to remain apolitical for pragmatic concerns, to isolate cultural and social spheres from the political in a space like KGNA is inherently problematic. Given that culture and identity are inherently political, the sentiment that one can remain "apolitical" exemplifies a number of fundamental concerns about the self-perception of the diaspora, especially in relation to respectability politics and US empire.

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

The preceding historical overview highlights that despite being vastly out-resourced and funded, the Kashmir American diaspora has the potential of playing an important role in bringing Kashmir to the attention of various US and UN bodies, and also serve in a mediating capacity to create a discourse surrounding the importance of a resolution, and push forward talks between India and Pakistan.

US Empire and the Kashmiri American Diaspora

One of the most important factors the Kashmiri American diaspora must acknowledge as they raise the Kashmir issue is how they are positioned and embedded in imperial frames in the context of US empire. As Engseng Ho writes in his analysis of the Muslim diaspora:

> The subversives who peopled such movements [diasporas] were mobile cosmopolitans whose agendas were presumably extraterritorial. . . . Their geographical mobility often meant crossing imperial and departmental jurisdictions, stretching the capacity of empire for political intelligence. . . . An inferior, subaltern entity which was nevertheless diasporic, cosmopolitan, and sophisticated like empire itself, and enough so to represent a potential threat.
>
> *(Ho 2004: 240)*

Thus, while the diaspora might have a certain privilege given its positionality (access to resources, different transnational networks), it can also potentially serve as a threat, especially in its imperial context, by privileging its perspectives and methods over that of the people in the homeland, as well as buying into the imperial logics of the country in which it resides, in this case the United States. There remains the "threat" of (mis)representation of the situation in Kashmir, people's aspirations, and the nuances of the sustained political struggle. For example, the diaspora might be compelled to craft a narrative that makes the Kashmir cause more palatable for the liberal, secular-leaning international audience. In my conversations with Kashmir-based activists, the threat of "misrepresentation" remains one of the primary concerns that people express about diaspora advocacy.

To exemplify this point, I focus attention on three key issues I have noted in relation to diaspora mobilization since August 2019: respectability politics, engagement with US imperial actors, and debates over the future of Kashmir.

In the immediate aftermath of August 5, the Kashmiri-American diaspora held diverse pro-Kashmir protests in cities including New York, Washington, DC, San Francisco, Atlanta, and Chicago. A number of these protests included the use of American flags. Although participants were protesting India's annexation of Kashmir, some members of the diaspora thought it was important to underscore that they were Americans first, and deeply patriotic. A number of people told me that they wanted to appear less "foreign" and "threatening" for average passersby, and that the flags would make them more approachable to "average Americans."

However, the group that had organized a number of these protests, Stand with Kashmir (SWK), had an official "no flags" policy due to the fraught and contested nature of nationalist symbols. In a memo to their regional leads, SWK emphasized that they encouraged participants to carry signs and images but to refrain from waving flags:

> We do not have to prove our loyalties to any state, but rather speak for universal values. Flags can be divisive, and alienate progressive allies. . . . We must understand that if we want allies from movements that speak out against American imperialism or police

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

> brutality, carrying an American flag, for example (a country that also engages in occupation and warfare) is in direct contrast to our principles.
>
> *(Email correspondence, Stand with Kashmir)*

This policy was met with criticism with some in the diaspora who felt that it was too aggressive and alienating.

In thinking though the politics of flags, I am attentive to the ways in which Muslim communities, especially after 9/11, have internalized Islamophobic rhetoric situating them as "foreign" or "the other." In doing so, they are constantly in the practice of having to reassert themselves in ways that make them palatable and conform to the average (read: white) American. This form of respectability politics views assertions of patriotism as being "authentically" American and a way to bridge the gap between minority and majority communities while highlighting their broader integration into American society. Yet, as we know from the example of Black Americans, respectability politics ultimately entrench rather than challenge the contours of mainstream identity politics, often to the detriment of multiple expressions of minority identities and in an attempt to accommodate neoliberalism (Harris 2014). Instead of pointing to the limitations of these discourses, for example, respectability succumbs to the logic of what counts as being "American." In addition, the relatively privileged class position of much of the Kashmiri American diaspora – in many ways a "model minority" in the racial hierarchies of the United States – creates a form of aspirational whiteness that also impacts how they view the terrain of advocacy. As a result, Kashmiri American advocacy remains anchored in the politics of race, class, and respectability. It is here, in particular, where a generational divide amongst first and second-generation activists can emerge. A number of those in the second generation have come to political consciousness in an era of criticism of US empire and racial politics and are much more familiar with the dangers or limitations of respectability politics. Their understanding of how advocacy should occur is in stark contrast to others who remain wedded to respectability.

Some in the diaspora were also keen on describing diaspora mobilizations as "peaceful" or "nonviolent," even just in statements of their group's work or mission. They pointed to the history of Muslim American activism, in particular, being criminalized in the US and how it was important to situate this activism as being "nonviolent," given the anxieties surrounding the War on Terror and its relationship to Kashmir. I was again struck by the internalization of Islamophobia in these conversations – this belief that Muslims must be *inherently* violent when doing any form of political advocacy, and that one needs to unilaterally assert oneself as the "nonviolent" Muslim in order to be acceptable. Here again, respectability politics conveys a message that there are still those who are "bad" Muslims – those who "we" are separate from. In buying into the logic of US empire (as well as Indian empire), and its own categorization of good vs. bad Muslims, this kind of respectability politics justifies anti-Muslim discourses while also criminalizing those for whom violence may be a part of a broader anti-colonial strategy. This tension raises questions about the binary between the diaspora and the ground. Does the diaspora have the moral authority to condemn the armed struggle in Kashmir? Even if it does not condemn or condone, how does it accurately represent the historical context of the armed struggle without falling into imperial narratives of "radicalization"?

Respectability politics expresses itself in other ways as well, primarily through the involvement of progressive allies or advocacy groups in certain actions. In a number of protests, solidarity organizations that stand against police brutality, such as like Black Lives Matter, were invited to speak, and they compared the militarized police infrastructure in the US and the violence it metes out against communities of color, in particular, with what was happening in Kashmir.

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

This pivot to an intersectional, transnational approach that foregrounds connections between multiple systems of oppression is critical for building a solidarity movement for Kashmir. However, some Kashmiri Americans again felt that it was not relevant to make those connections, and even if it was, "we might be alienating those who might sympathize with us." The "not all cops" mantra was an oft-repeated statement. I was particularly struck by a moment in a protest in NYC that was surrounded by the NYPD, when an older Kashmiri man started chanting "Thank you, NYPD" and some others followed, while other activists were aghast at the use of the slogan. Here again, respectability politics stands in the way of building meaningful relationships with those groups who also face different types of systemic oppression and institutionalized violence.

Linked to the question of respectability politics is another query pertaining to the efficacy of political advocacy in Washington, DC. To be sure, the diaspora faces a formidable rival – the pro-India lobby in the United States – as well as the increased economic and political ties between the United States and India. The scope for American action on Kashmir is limited given the reality of US-India relations. As Bald et al. (2013: 12) note,

> India has figured as a major focus of US capital expansion over the past two decades of neoliberal globalization. It is one of the fastest growing global markets for US goods, as well as a source of cheap outsourced labor for US technology, communications, and legal firms.

In addition, there is a sizable Indian-American professional class that has grown in size and wealth in recent decades. The US-based Campaign to Stop Funding Hate has revealed the growing power, size, and wealth of the Indian-American professional class. Indians are celebrated in US media reports as entrepreneurs and CEOs, and Bollywood and yoga continue to leverage significant soft power for India. The influence of Indian Americans is also "manifest in the quest flow of hundreds of thousands of NRI dollars to support the violently reactionary Hindu nationalist Sangh Parivar in India" (Bald et al. 2013: 12–13).

The small Kashmiri American diaspora is certainly no match for the pro-India lobby and its allies, which increasingly includes the pro-Israel lobby, white supremacists, and Kashmiri Pandit groups. This is evidenced by the ways in which pro-India lobbies, including groups like the Hindu American Foundation, were able to suspend the introduction of House Resolution 745, a bipartisan resolution that raised the issue of human rights in Kashmir in the aftermath of the abrogation (Kumar and Lacy 2020). Based on my own personal experiences, these groups also tried to repeatedly disrupt the talks and teach-ins in universities and community spaces across the country, labelling the speakers as "jihadist sympathizers" and "spreading Islamist propaganda." However, as iterated to me by Fai, this has been a long-standing practice of some members of the Indian and Kashmiri Pandit diaspora (Fai, Interview 2020).

While the pro-India lobby is highly mobilized and well connected, the Kashmiri diaspora, with the support of a number of progressive groups, managed to draw the attention of US elected officials, some of whom sent letters to the Indian embassy or the White House and made public statements on the human rights situation in Kashmir. The diaspora raised money for a number of congressional representatives. Nonetheless, Kashmiri American efforts to appeal to the US political establishment are fraught with contradictions. On House Resolution 745, many elected officials were approached by the pro-India lobby as well, and some later softened their criticism of India and did not insist that the resolution make it to the House floor. While I argue diaspora mobilization should include political advocacy and congressional lobbying, these efforts should bear in mind that the US has its own imperial foreign policy agenda and

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

interests. A strategy that solely focuses on political advocacy is not tenable, especially as it will be dependent on how the US positions its relationship with India as well as the Indian-American community. These contradictions raise the larger question of how a strategy that incorporates political advocacy can invoke the moral responsibility of the US while at the same time maintain a critique of US imperialism?

Finally, when it comes to the future of Kashmir, I argue that it is important for the diaspora to focus its efforts on calling for the right to self-determination, instead of articulating a particular future for the region. A number of diaspora groups are explicit in their stance of being either pro-Pakistan or pro-independence. However, the only ethical stance one can take is to foreground the will of the people, even while maintaining one's own personal perspective. Otherwise, the diaspora falls into the dangers of "misrepresentation" and can privilege their own positions over those in Kashmir.

This issue is also linked to the question of the Pakistan state and Pakistani American groups. The pro-India lobby leverages two main attacks against the Kashmiri diaspora: they claim that Pakistan is running and funding diaspora mobilizations, and that the diaspora is full of "ISI agents," thereby reinforcing the issue as a conflict between India and Pakistan and erasing the agency of Kashmiri Americans; and they link diaspora efforts with "Islamist" or "jihadist groups," especially as a number of American Muslim organizations have also raised concerns over India's actions in Kashmir. For some in the diaspora, the response to these attacks might be to portray a completely secular narrative that erases the religious specificities of Kashmir. To be sure, Kashmir is not "just" a Muslim issue; however, it is undeniable that Kashmiri Muslims are being targeted specifically due to their religious identity. To erase the importance of a Muslim identity to how many Kashmiris perceive their reality is disingenuous and again falls into the trap of "misrepresentation" for the sake of secular palatability.

Working with the government of Pakistan will be a fraught exercise for the Kashmir diaspora. Although Pakistan is one of the few countries that supports the right to self-determination, the post-August 5 diaspora mobilizations made it clear that advocacy for Kashmir should remain distinct from the Pakistan state's narrative. The international and domestic policy community perceives Pakistan as advocating for Kashmir to serve its own national interest. Thus, the diaspora must create its own space independent of the India vs. Pakistan binary, while still calling for the right to self-determination for Kashmiris. Exercise of the right to self-determination includes an option of merger with Pakistan. Any alliance with Pakistani state affiliates and individuals should also bear this concern in mind.

Building a Grassroots, Transnational Solidarity Model

In the United States, the political climate supporting Kashmir's self-determination is limited. Conversely, there is broad support relating to human rights concerns, given the number of supporting congressional statements after August 5, 2019. For diaspora mobilizations in the United States to gain ground, Kashmir needs to be embedded in domestic politics. This is increasingly possible given the influence and actions of the pro-India and Hindutva lobby. The rise of fascism in India provides an opportunity for the stranglehold of the "world's largest democracy" to give way, as US media, corporations, universities, and think-tanks will have to recalibrate their narratives on India. Although this will create space for the Kashmir narrative to gain traction, the space will remain limited as long as the US aligns its foreign policy interests with India. The diaspora, while having relative power compared to its numbers, cannot contend with the influence of the Indian lobby on its own. Therefore, it must engage both domestic and transnational channels and modes of solidarity to leverage support for Kashmir. These can include

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

providing humanitarian support, investing in human capital from Kashmir, starting a Boycott India campaign, establishing durable coalitions with transnational progressive and/or Muslim movements, and building grassroots solidarity efforts and political advocacy networks in the US. Furthermore, the rise of diasporic solidarity communities including progressive diaspora groups from South Asia, such as South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT) and South Asia Solidarity Initiative (SASI) allow for greater collaboration. Coalition-building is the diaspora's fundamental task, and it should include groups working on issues including climate change, militarism and war, and gender violence. These multipronged activities should involve a number of different diaspora groups.

This also entails an understanding of the importance of intersectionality informed by feminist models of anti-occupation struggles that foreground issues of positionality while also pointing to interlocking and multiple systems of oppression – such as class, caste, race, and gender – and how they determine people's lived realities. Another shift for the diaspora to consider is to reposition the question of Kashmir at the core of a number of other simultaneously ongoing political struggles and liberation movements (Salih, Welchman and Zambelli 2017). It is a critical time to create a kind of politics that is able to move beyond exclusively identitarian, religious, or sectarian impulses and is sustained by shared experiences of living under conditions of colonialism and occupation. In doing so, of course, the uniqueness of each individual struggle must be respected.

Thinking intersectionally also precipitates a move beyond a human rights or minority rights legal framework in the case of Kashmir, and toward an anti-colonial liberation framework. While the diaspora can strategically utilize a human rights framework when needed, it must also understand that a singular focus on human rights, ignoring liberation, can backfire. The focus on human rights oftentimes obfuscates the underlying political dynamics, can depoliticize the core issues, and is entangled with colonial and neoliberal power. For example, Amnesty International criticizes India's poor record on human rights in Jammu and Kashmir, but they do not acknowledge the root of the issue – which is political. Human rights organizations often duplicate the language of the colonizing powers. This occurs because the "reference point and authority" of a "juridical, rights-based discourse" are placed with and referred to "bodies, institutions, conventions, rulings and resolutions that are rooted in hegemonic, juridical structures rather than indigenous, justice and liberation centered ones" (Salih, Welchman and Zambelli 2017: 14).

The work of first and second generation diaspora Kashmiris points toward the increased use of a multifaceted approach relying broadly on a multisited embeddedness that entails a form of belonging to and engagement with multiple communities, contexts, and hybridities. For example, the Kashmiri Muslim diaspora in the US must contend not only with the occupation of the "homeland," but also with anti-Muslim racism and War on Terror frameworks that emerge both in the homeland as well as the United States. Here, the need for intersectional approaches is critical to resist multiple modes of oppression.

The opportunity now exists for the broader Kashmir diaspora intelligentsia – armed with its scholarship and networks – to reimagine the conditions of possibility for Kashmir, both epistemically but also materially. Some of this work is already occurring, as Kashmir scholars across multiple geograpies are challenging the prevailing academic discourses on Kashmir, and as more Kashmir-based scholars pursue their PhDs and publish critical scholarship on resistance and occupation. Advocacy efforts will continue to follow suit. Nonetheless, the success of diaspora engagement will rely on how much buy-in these efforts get from Kashmiris within Kashmir, and the ways in which the diaspora seeks to continuously be informed by considerations from the ground, rather than imposing its own frameworks.

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

Conclusion

August 5, 2019, served as another "critical juncture" in India's long-standing occupation of Kashmir. As a moment that significantly threatens Kashmiri identity, land, and livelihood, and precipitates a settler colonial project, it requires a thorough introspection by the diaspora of its advocacy on Kashmir. For a truly transformative transnational solidarity framework, the diaspora must move beyond identitarian claims and toward an intersectional approach that recognizes the multiple layers and vectors of oppression and seeks to dismantle internal hierarchies including race, gender, sexuality, and class, among others. The Kashmir issue is part of a broader network of colonial violence and occupation that is rooted in global interconnections. Youth activists in Kashmir certainly recognize this, as should the diaspora. Given that the diaspora itself inhabits multiple belongings and diverse allegiances, "liberation" must be defined beyond the more classic territorial and national boundaries.

The Kashmir diaspora and other allies – which increasingly include progressive South Asian organizations – can play an important role in how the US-India relationship matures. It is important to change the perception of India in the United States. At the moment, US support for the right to self-determination is minimal. But given the right opportunity, and the appropriate multipronged approach, including grassroots, institutional, and international awareness, the possibilities are endless. To succeed, the diaspora must focus on that which unites instead of divides. Ideology, personality, and ego, must be left aside. The work must be sustained and proactive, and not only responsive to transformative events. While the diaspora must be cognizant of its privilege and responsibility, it must also recall that the hard work of resistance is happening, every day, in Kashmir.

Works Cited

Ali, Nasreen. 2009. "The Making of Kashmiri Identity." *South Asian Diaspora* 1(2): 181–192.

Bald, Vivek, Miabi Chatterji, Sujani Reddy, and Manu Vimalassery. 2013. "Introduction." In *The Sun Never Sets: South Asian Migrants in an Age of US Power*, Vol. 2. New York: New York University Press.

Baruah, A. 2007. "India a 'Reliable Ally' Against Global Terrorism: U.S. Reports." *The Hindu*, January 13.

Biswas, Bidisha. 2010. "Negotiating the Nation: Diaspora Contestations in the USA about Hindu nationalism in India." *Nation and Nationalisms* 16(4): 696–714.

Bourgois, Philippe and Jeffrey Schonberg. 2009. *Righteous Dopefiend*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ellis, Patricia and Zafar Khan. 1998. "Diasporic Mobilization and the Kashmir Issue in British Politics." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 24(3): 471–488.

Fai, Ghulam Nabi. Interview with Author. March 2020.

Harris, Fredrick C. 2014. "The Rise of Respectability Politics." *Dissent* 61(1): 33–37.

Ho, Enseng. 2004. "Empire Through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other Boat." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46(2): 210–246.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2009. "The India-US Rapprochement: State Drive or Middle Class-Driven?" *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 65(1): 1–14.

Jaffrelot, Christophe and Ingrid Therwath. 2007. "The Sangh Parivar and the Hindu Diaspora in the West: What kind of 'Long-Distance Nationalism?'" *International Political Sociology* 1(3): 278–295.

Jain, B. M. 2016. *India-US Relations in the Age of Uncertainty: An Uneasy Courtship*. New York: Routledge.

Kashmir American Council. 2001. "Schedule of Mr. Muhammad Yasin Malik." Personal Archives, Ghulam Nabi Fai.

———. 2004. "The Brussels Resolution." Personal Archives. Ghulam Nabi Fai.

Kashmir Study Group. Access April 24, 2020. www.kashmirstudygroup.com.

Kathwari, Farooq. 2019. *Trailblazer: From the Mountains of Kashmir to the Summit of Global Business and Beyond*. Austin, TX: Greenleaf Book Group Press.

Kirk, Jason. 2008. "Indian-Americans and the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?" *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4(3): 275–300.

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.

Koinova, Maria. 2016. "Sustained vs Episodic Mobilization among Conflict-Generated diasporas." *International Political Science Review* 37(4): 500–516.
———. 2017. "Beyond Statist Parameters: Sociospatial Positionality and Diaspora Mobilization in International Relations." *International Studies Review* 19(4): 597–621.
———. 2018. "Critical Junctures and Transformative Events in Diaspora Mobilization for Kosovo and Palestinian statehood." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44(8): 1289–1308.
Kumar, Rashmeee and Akela Lacy. 2020. "India Lobbies to Stifle Criticism, Control Messaging in U.S. Congress amid Rising Anti-Muslim Violence." *The Intercept*, March 16.
Kurien, Prema. 2004. "Multiculturalism, Immigrant Religion, and Diasporic Nationalism: The Development of an American Hinduism." *Social Problems* 51(3): 362–385.
———. 2017. "Majority Versus Minority Religious Status and Diasporic Nationalism: Indian American Advocacy Organizations." *Nation and Nationalism* 23(1): 109–128.
Maira, Sunaina Marr. 2016. *The 9/11 Generation: Youth Rights, and Solidarity in the War on Terror*. New York: New York University Press.
Mir, Ghulam Nabi. Interview with Author. March 2020.
Mir, Imraan. Interview with Author. March 2020.
Mishra, Sangay. 2016. *Desis Divided: The Political Lives of South Asian Americans*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Mistry, Dinshaw. 2013–2014. "The India Lobby and the Nuclear Agreement with India." *Political Science Quarterly* 128(4): 717–746.
Naber, Nadine. 2006. "The Rules of Forced Engagement: Race, Gender, and the Culture of Fear among Arab Immigrants in San Francisco Post-9/11." *Cultural Dynamics* 18(3): 235–267.
Peled, Miko. 2018. *Injustice: The Story of the Holy Land Foundation Five*. Washington, DC: Just World Books.
Peteet, Julie. 2007. "Problematizing a Palestinian Diaspora." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39(4): 627–646.
Rajagopal, Arvind. 2000. "Hindu Nationalism in the US: Changing Configurations of Political Practice." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23(3): 467–496.
"Relating to the Conflict in Kashmir." March 29, 1995. HR 123, 104th Congress, 1st Session.
Sadeque, Samira. 2019. "How a Red Dot Symbolized Kashmir Resistance Against India's Move." *Al Jazeera English*, August 16. www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/red-dot-symbolised-kashmiri-resistance-india-move-190815113019954.html.
Salih, Ruba, Lynn Welchman, and Elena Zambelli. 2017. "The Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM): Transnational Politics, Inter-national Frameworks and Intersectional Alliances." Power2Youth Working Paper, No. 27, April. www.iai.it/sites/default/files/p2y_27.pdf.
Smith, Hazel. 2007. "Diasporas in International Conflict." In *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers*, edited by Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, 3–16. Tokyo, New York and Paris: United Nations University Press.
Sökefeld, Martin and Marta Bolognani. 2011. "Kashmiris in Britain: A Political Project or a Social Reality?" In *Pakistan and its Diaspora*, edited by Marta Bolognani and Stephen M. Lyon, 111–131. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Takyar, Delaram. 2019. "When Interest Doesn't Turn into Action: Discrimination, Group Identification, and Muslim Political Engagement in the Post-9/11 Era." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 82(3): 231–253.
USA vs. Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai. 2012. Case No. 1:11-cr-561, Document 68. www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/2035.pdf.
Van de Wetering, Carina. 2016. *Changing US Foreign Policy Toward India: US-India Relations Since the Cold War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Visweswaran, Kamala. 1994. *Fictions of Feminist Ethnography*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Copyright © 2022. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Routledge Handbook of Critical Kashmir Studies, edited by Mona Bhan, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rmit/detail.action?docID=7017392.
Created from rmit on 2022-10-05 21:07:09.